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Abstract 
This study presents an innovative approach to hand-coding parties’ policy preferences 
in the relatively new, cross-sectoral field of climate change mitigation policy. It 
applies this approach to party manifestos in six countries, comparing the preferences 
of parties in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the UK over the past two 
decades. It probes the data for evidence of validity through content validation and 
convergent/discriminant validation and engages with the debate on position-taking in 
environmental policy by developing a positional measure that incorporates ‘pro’ and 
‘anti’ climate policy preferences. The analysis provides evidence for the validity of 
the new measures, shows that they are distinct from comparable measures of 
environmental policy preferences, and argues that they are more comprehensive than 
existing climate policy measures. The new measures strengthen the basis for 
answering questions that are central to climate politics and to party politics. The 
approach developed here has important implications for the study of new, complex, or 
cross-cutting policy issues and issues that include both valence and positional aspects. 
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The success of the Paris Agreement, adopted at the COP21 climate conference in 
December 2015, depends heavily on the effectiveness of national climate change 
mitigation policies (henceforth: climate policies). Political parties will play a critical 
role in determining whether governments develop these policies (Birchall, 2014; 
Jensen and Spoon, 2011; Schulze, 2014); they also have a unique role in shaping 
attitudes (Brulle et al., 2012); and they are central to our understanding of political 
risks and uncertainties in climate policy (IPCC, 2014: 6). This article addresses a 
lacuna in the literature by presenting an innovative approach to measuring the climate 
policy preferences of political parties that involves coding the climate change 
mitigation policy content of party manifestos.  
Developing valid measures of parties’ climate policy preferences is a pre-
requisite for comparative research concerning issue politicization, party competition, 
party government and political leadership on climate change and we argue that 
existing measures, while useful, have important shortcomings, some of which are 
related to characteristics of climate policy itself. First, it is a relatively new policy 
area. While collecting data on new issues is obviously important they can be difficult 
to incorporate into established coding schemes (Dolezal et al., 2014: 57). Second, 
climate policy is a cross-cutting and multi-sectoral issue, which makes it difficult to 
accommodate in hierarchically-organised coding schemes. Third, climate policy may 
have both ‘valence’ and ‘positional’ aspects, which has implications for how it is 
measured (Carter and Clements, 2015; Gemenis et al., 2012). It shares these 
characteristics, to varying degrees, with other issues such as social exclusion, 
European integration, and immigration (Kriesi et al. 2008: 66; Guinaudeau and 
Persico 2013; Castelli Gattinara 2016: 18-20). We will argue further that existing 
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attempts to measure parties’ climate policy preferences are limited by their relatively 
narrow focus on single countries, single parties, and on subsets of climate policies. 
This study contributes to the nascent literature on parties’ climate policies by 
presenting a new approach that we apply to six countries, measuring the preferences 
of the two largest parties in Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the UK 
over the past two decades. Using Adcock and Collier’s (2001) types of measurement 
validation as a framework, we provide evidence for the measures’ validity through 
content validation and convergent/discriminant validation and we build on existing 
research on parties’ environmental policy positions to develop a positional indicator 
of parties’ climate policy preferences. 
The article begins by reviewing existing approaches to measuring parties’ 
environmental and climate policy preferences while setting out properties that valid 
measures of parties’ climate policy preferences should possess. It presents a new 
approach to comparing parties’ climate policy preferences and describes the coding of 
data from party manifestos. The analysis then examines the validity of the measures 
produced through content validation and convergent/discriminant validation, 
respectively, before assessing the validity of a positional measure of parties’ climate 
policy preferences. Finally, it discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the measures 
it produces, identifies questions to which they can be usefully applied, and highlights 
the potential of this new approach for measuring party preferences in other policy 
areas. 
Measuring parties’ climate policy preferences  
A climate policy is ‘a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks 
of greenhouse gases’ (IPCC, 2014: 4). Climate policies therefore range across many 
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substantive policy domains. There has been growing interest in national climate 
policies in recent years as a subject that is distinct from environmental policy. 
However, comparative scholarship on the domestic politics of climate change is 
relatively underdeveloped (Bernauer 2013; Lachapelle and Paterson, 2013: 548) and 
political parties’ climate policy preferences, including their measurement, have 
received little attention. 
Most measures of party preferences related to climate change focus on 
environmental policy, broadly construed. The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) 
(Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006) identifies and codes a diverse set of 
environmental issues in its ‘Environmental protection’ category (per 501). The 
Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) takes a similarly broad approach to coding 
environmental policy in party manifestos in its ‘Environment’ category. Significantly, 
it contains a subcategory (#705) that includes some important climate policy content 
(‘Air pollution, Global Warming, and Noise Pollution’; henceforth CAP705) (Bevan, 
2014). Several expert surveys include measures of parties’ environmental policy 
preferences (Bakker et al., 2015; Benoit and Laver, 2006; Rohrschneider and Miles, 
2015). The expert-coded EU Profiler and EU&I data also includes parties’ positions 
on some specific environmental issues in 2009 and 2014 (Trechsel, 2009; Trechsel et 
al., 2014). Others have used relational content analysis of media coverage to measure 
parties’ preferences (Helbling and Tresch, 2011), including on the environment 
(Kriesi et al., 2008: 60). 
Studies specifically addressing parties’ climate policy preferences are limited 
in their scope and comprehensiveness. Båtstrand (2014) examines the climate policies 
of four Norwegian parties in 2009, while Båtstrand (2015) provides a qualitative 
cross-national analysis of nine conservative parties. These studies identify climate 
6 
 
policy pledges in party manifestos, but only if the party itself explicitly linked them to 
climate change. Moreover, Båtstrand’s interest is specific to certain research 
questions. The Norwegian study codes pledges only if they are relevant to the 
dimension underlying ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics (Båtstrand, 2014). The later, cross-
national study, focuses on whether the parties ‘express trust in in the concept of 
anthropogenic climate change’ and whether they propose climate policy measures ‘in 
line with free market environmentalism’ (Båtstrand, 2015).  
Other studies focus on short periods in individual countries. De Blasio and 
Sorice (2013) compare the attention devoted to climate change by Italian parties in 
mid-2012, using keyword searches for ‘climate change’ and cognate terms in party 
documents. Case studies of individual parties (Carter and Clements, 2015) and studies 
of single-party governments also focus on parties’ climate policies (Carter and Jacobs, 
2014; Birchall, 2014), but do not develop a systematic, general approach to measuring 
parties’ policy preferences. 
We develop and examine new measures of parties’ climate policy preferences 
using two of Adcock and Collier’s (2001) types of measurement validation: content 
validation and convergent/discriminant validation. Content validation refers to the 
relationship between the indicator and the ‘systematised concept’ and it is a necessary 
condition for establishing overall validity. In this regard, a first desirable property of 
any indicator is that it should include key elements and exclude inappropriate 
elements (Adcock and Collier 2001: 538-539).  
The most fundamental problem regarding the validity of the measures 
described above relates to content validation. Some clearly leave out important 
elements of climate policy (e.g., Båtstrand, 2014, 2015; De Blasio and Sorice, 2013): 
the CMP codebook did not mention climate change until 2014. Hierarchical coding 
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schemes such as the CAP and CMP present a more general problem: while mutually 
exclusive, hierarchically-organised categories enable these data sets to cover a wide 
range of policy domains, they invariably exclude important content because a piece of 
text can belong only to one category (e.g., climate policy or energy or agriculture). 
Consequently, the salience of issues cutting across many categories is likely to be 
underestimated (Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013) and some measures leave out 
important elements of climate policy, such as renewable energy and energy efficiency 
measures, that are contained in other categories.   
Some measures have the opposite problem: they include elements that clearly 
fall outside any definition of climate policy. This is the case for all general measures 
of environmental policy preferences, whether from manifestos, expert surveys, or 
media content analyses. The CMP Environmental Protection category refers, amongst 
other issues, to ‘Animal rights’ and a ‘great variance of policies that have the unified 
goal of environmental protection’ (Volkens et al., 2016). The CAP Environment 
subcategories are likewise wide-ranging, including, for instance, Drinking Water 
Safety and Water Supply (Bevan, 2014). This problem also applies to some climate 
policy-specific indicators. CAP705 includes such issues as ‘noise pollution 
development, rules of upper decibel levels in public space, noise nuisance in 
kindergartens’ (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015: 20).  
Convergent/discriminant validation concerns an indicator’s relationships with 
other measures. We expect measures of the same concept to be empirically associated 
(i.e., to converge) (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 540); this is a second desirable property 
of any new measure. Following from this, the closer the association of a given 
measure with parties’ climate policy preferences (rather than environmental policy 
preferences), the stronger the relationship should be with the measures of climate 
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policy preferences developed here. Yet it should not be so strong (i.e., approaching 
identity) to suggest that the measures developed here add little or nothing to existing 
measures.  
Drawing on the literature on position-taking in environmental policy, we 
identify a third desirable property of a valid measure of climate policy preferences: 
that it can take into account policy preferences that directly subvert climate policy 
goals. Even where a party proposes climate change mitigation policies, the effects of 
those policies could be undermined if it also proposes policies that would increase 
emissions, such as increased support for new coal-fired power stations. Identifying 
such measures helps to control for internal inconsistency in party policy that may 
arise from ‘greenwashing’, the kind of ‘cheap talk’ that can be mistaken for an 
indicator of a party’s policy preferences. 
While environmental policy is widely regarded as ‘a classic valence issue’, 
this assumption is increasingly being questioned. Climate policy in particular is an 
issue sometimes characterised by sharp disagreement, which can range from climate 
change deniers questioning the very fundamentals of climate science to conflict over 
specific climate measures, such as expanding onshore wind power or the use of green 
taxes. Such tensions can underpin partisan divisions over climate change (Guber, 
2013; Carter and Clements, 2015). More generally, saliency theory has been 
questioned (Dolezal et al., 2014); the value of measuring both salience and position 
has been highlighted (e.g., Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014); and the CMP has been 
criticised for failing to separate its indicators of salience and position (Lowe et al., 
2011: 133; Dolezal et al., 2014: 61-62; cf. Volkens, 2007: 117). We do not settle these 
questions here, but we do build on Compston and Bailey’s (2013) concept of ‘anti-
climate policy’ and Weale et al.’s (2000: 247-250) approach to constructing an 
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environmental policy index to develop a measure that can be regarded as ‘positional’ 
at the level of climate policy preferences.   
Coding parties’ climate policy preferences  
Existing manifesto-based projects using hand-coding provide a basis for important 
elements of our coding scheme. Like the CMP, CAP and Båtstrand (2014, 2015), we 
use parties’ main pre-election documents as the principal source of data (see 
Appendix A). The benefits of using these documents are well-known: they set out the 
party’s official policy preferences, they are publicly available and amenable to ex post 
analysis, and they are unlikely to contain only ‘cheap talk’. 
Like the CMP and CAP projects, we use quasi-sentences – ‘the verbal 
expression of one political idea or issue’ (Klingemann et al., 2006: 165) – as the unit 
of observation (see Appendix B).
 
 We also share their assumption that the proportion 
of a party document devoted to a particular type of content is related to its ‘salience’ 
for that party, which in turn reflects its policy preferences. 
Unlike these projects, we focus on a single policy area (climate policy), 
anchored in a single hypothetical policy outcome (greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions). 
We assume that the relative simplicity of our coding scheme reduces coding error 
compared to more complex schemes covering numerous policy areas, consistent with 
criticisms of coding scheme complexity made by both architects and critics of the 
CMP (Budge, 2006: 84; Mikhaylov et al., 2012: 80).
1
 Moreover, its relative simplicity 
                                                 
1
 We outline several ways in which we aimed to minimise error. We cannot measure the 
reduction in error resulting from these decisions; rather, our argument that these features 
reduce error is based on assumptions that are grounded in the existing literature. 
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facilitates the coding of a cross-sectoral issue, building on previous approaches to 
coding EU issues in the CAP project (Guinaudeau and Persico, 2013). 
We aim to reduce potential ambiguity in the coding scheme (and, thus, the 
likelihood of coding error) by explicitly articulating our coding categories, which 
follow from the definition of climate policy set out above. Our first substantive 
concern is with ‘pro-climate’ content: content that indicates support for policies that 
would, if implemented, reduce GHG emissions or enhance GHG sinks. Many such 
policies in developed economies are well-mapped in standard accounts (e.g., 
Compston and Bailey, 2016). They typically include supports for energy efficiency, 
the reduction of emissions from specific sectors (e.g., energy, transport, and 
agriculture), and overarching measures such as carbon pricing and the creation of 
institutions to govern climate policy. However, party documents are not simply lists 
of policy proposals: much text simply expresses a party’s general attitude or 
sentiment on an issue. Where this indicates support for emissions-reducing policies, it 
is also coded as ‘pro-climate’ content. Examples include content acknowledging 
climate change as a policy problem and expressing support for climate change 
mitigation or for environmental protection that implicitly includes climate protection.  
Coding was carried out by researchers with expertise in climate policy and 
with knowledge of each country. Hand-coding of manifestos facilitated the 
application of context-sensitive expertise at the level of individual quasi-sentences 
(Volkens 2007: 117). This expertise is important for two reasons: first, because the 
coding of these categories is, in principle, context specific: the same policy in two 
countries may have a different significance. For example, building nuclear power 
capacity in a country that depends wholly on coal for electricity generation will 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions; building it in a country that depends wholly on 
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renewable sources of electricity may increase emissions. Second, sometimes further 
research was required to establish the policy’s prospective impact on GHG emissions 
at the time the manifesto was published, and coders with expertise were well-placed 
to carry out that research. An example was high speed rail in the UK, which was 
ultimately coded as having an ambiguous effect on the UK’s emissions.2 While, in 
practice, many policies were coded similarly across contexts, the accommodation of 
context-sensitive expertise speaks to criticisms of manifesto-based data for being 
insufficiently sensitive to context (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006; Mölder, 2016) and 
has a precedent in evidence-based expert-coding (Trechsel, 2009). 
We aimed to minimize error further through central coordination and 
standardized procedures, drawing on lessons from other, larger hand-coding projects 
(Budge et al, 2001, Ch.4; Volkens, 2009). Coders received a set of instructions 
(Appendix B) and a piece of correctly-coded text as an example. Where difficult 
coding decisions arose, these were coded as such and then discussed and resolved 
with (and among) the authors, who coordinated the coding process. Some 69% of 
manifestos were double-checked by different coders. This was particularly intensive 
earlier in the coding process, as difficult coding issues were resolved and coding 
decisions standardized (see Volkens, 2009: 244). However, this did not amount to 
independent coding of manifestos by multiple coders and like other projects based on 
hand-coding, we face potential problems of reliability (Volkens 2007: 118). Where 
doubts remained about an item, claims made in the party document regarding the 
emissions-impact of a policy measure were taken into account (i.e., parties were given 
the ‘benefit of the doubt’). 
                                                 
2 ‘Ambiguous’ quasi-sentences were not counted as pro- (or anti-) climate content. 
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A set of subcategories was developed to provide insights into the substantive 
content of the ‘pro-climate’ text and as a means of systematically varying the content 
of our measures (see Table 1). To assign text to these substantive subcategories, each 
quasi-sentence was inductively labelled with a topic and then aggregated into broader, 
logically coherent categories. The aggregation of these labels fed back into the 
development of a codebook delimiting the categories (Appendix C). Coders also 
completed a questionnaire concerning basic document characteristics for each 
manifesto that we use later in the analysis (Appendix D). 
Following the same procedures, we laid the basis for a positional measure of 
climate policy preferences by identifying ‘anti-climate’ content. Drawing on 
Compston and Bailey’s (2013) work on governments’ ‘anti-climate’ policies and a 
broader definition of climate policy covering all policy measures that influence 
emissions (EBRD and GRI, 2011: 60), we identified content that indicates support for 
policies that would increase GHG emissions or diminish GHG sinks. It includes 
quasi-sentences that deny that climate change is a problem, oppose climate change 
mitigation policies, or make specific policy proposals (e.g., opening a new airport) 
that would increase GHG emissions (Compston and Bailey, 2013: 147–148; see Table 
2).
3
 
Case selection 
The data cover 64 parties-at-elections in six countries (Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, and the UK) from the mid-1990s until 2015. The manifestos vary in 
length: the Danish documents are particularly short: 338 quasi-sentences on average, 
compared to a mean document length of 1161 quasi-sentences across all coded 
                                                 
3
 We use Compston and Bailey’s (2013: 148) list of anti-climate policies as a starting point, 
but we do not adhere to it strictly (see Appendix B).  
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documents.
 4
 Occasionally, the main parties were electoral coalitions (e.g., in Italy in 
2001 and 2006) Sometimes a party’s manifesto also represented smaller parties 
belonging to their electoral coalition (e.g., the Danish centre-left in 2011); here, we 
assume that the preferences of the main coalition party are accurately represented in 
the document (see Appendix A for details).  
The six West European countries selected have much in common: they are all 
longstanding EU member states; they each have an established environmental policy 
arena; and, with the exception of France, they are heavily dependent on fossil fuels. 
Within that universe, they are diverse along dimensions that may influence the 
structure of climate politics (although given the paucity of existing research our 
expectations are necessarily tentative). They encompass both leaders and laggards on 
climate policy; small and large countries; a range of public concern about climate 
change; a variety of greenhouse gas emissions profiles, measured by per-capita 
emissions, the share of emissions from agriculture compared to fossil-fuel use, and 
the range of policy effort required for the 2012 and 2020 commitment periods. 
Overall, we expect inter-country differences to be relatively small given these 
important similarities; an expectation supported by ANOVA tests on each of the 
measures, which show no statistically significant differences between country means. 
The period covered encompasses several electoral cycles in each country (32 
in total) allowing us to examine variation in climate policy preferences within parties 
over time. It begins before the Kyoto Protocol was agreed (1997) and after climate 
change had become a distinct policy problem for governments in the early 1990s. 
                                                 
4
 We ran the tests for convergent/discriminant validation that follow while excluding the 
Danish documents (n=14). Our findings are generally borne out by these tests, although in 
some instances the reduced n leads to higher p-values. See Appendix F. 
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Within each country, we focus on the two largest parties by vote share before 
each election.
5
 Due to their centrality to coalition formation, national policy, and 
public opinion, these are parties of particular substantive importance and therefore for 
the study of party government and political leadership on climate change. The 
selection of parties also limits diversity in key respects. Each party could expect to 
enter government in the short or medium term (i.e., they were ‘parties of 
government’). Consequently, they could anticipate having to solve emergent policy 
problems; , variation in their responses to climate change is therefore interesting and, 
in the face of a clear policy problem such as climate change, potentially puzzling.  
In each country, we cover periods when each party has been in government 
and in opposition and, in each country, the two parties fall on either side of the main 
left-right cleavage structuring the party system (the exception being the Irish party 
system). Following from existing studies of parties’ climate policies (e.g., Batstrand, 
2014, 2015) we expect left-of-centre parties to develop more progressive climate 
policy preferences than right-of-centre parties.  
 
Pro-climate content: general description 
Across 64 documents, 4568 quasi-sentences were coded as ‘pro-climate’ content. The 
mean proportion of a manifesto accounted for by pro-climate policy is 6.0% (sd=3.1). 
Figure 1 shows considerable variation between parties and, within parties, variation 
over time. Denmark’s centre-right Venstre, for example, included no pro-climate 
content in 1994 or 1998, while in 2007 it occupied 17% of its manifesto’s text. This 
extreme case of within-party variation finds confirmation in case studies developed 
                                                 
5
 There is one marginal exception to this rule: Denmark’s Venstre before the 1994 election. In 
1990, it had secured 0.6% less than the Conservatives. 
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elsewhere (Seeberg 2016). Other high-points in the amount of pro-climate content 
(e.g., the Italian Partito Democratico in 2008; the Danish Social Democrats in 2007) 
also accord with existing case studies (Carter et al. 2014), as do some low-points (the 
UK Conservatives in 1997 and 2001; Ireland’s Fianna Fáil in 2011; the Italian centre-
right in 2006) (Carter and Clements  2015; Little 2017; Pizzimenti 2009). More 
generally, the difference between centre-left parties (mean = 6.8%) and centre-right 
parties (mean = 5.4%) is in the expected direction and statistically significant (p = 
0.04), while the difference between pre-economic crisis (before mid-2008; mean = 
6.4%) and parties since the crisis (after mid-2008; mean = 5.2%) is significant at the 
0.1 level.
6
 
 
 
 
 
 [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Content validation and a Core measure 
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between our data and alternative measures is 
the amount of content coded as relevant to climate policy and thus its 
comprehensiveness. The most directly-comparable measure in the CAP (CAP705) 
includes an average of four quasi-sentences for each document we code. The CMP 
Environmental Protection category (mean = 34 quasi-sentences) and the CAP 
Environment category (mean = 50) both have a broader base of content. The content 
coded for our measure incorporates an average of 70 ‘pro-climate’ quasi-sentences 
per document and is more squarely focused on climate policy per se.  
                                                 
6
 One-tailed t-tests assuming equal variance. 
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Table 1 provides an overview of the substantive content of the text coded as 
‘pro-climate’. In the average manifesto, 84% of pro-climate content is accounted for 
by six categories of quasi-sentence encompassing content that is generally 
acknowledged as being relevant to greenhouse gas emissions. These are general pro-
environment content indicating support for reduced GHG emissions (35%); and 
content indicating support for lower-carbon transport (11%); energy (13%); energy 
efficiency (7%); carbon sinks (3%); and other specific climate policy content (14%). 
The remainder of the coded content, accounting for 16% of the average 
manifesto’s pro-climate content (and 1% of the manifesto’s overall content), concerns 
policies typically seen as being less central aspects of climate policy: planning, waste 
and agriculture measures, and negative mentions of economic growth. To address 
doubts concerning the relevance of the coded text in these categories, and following 
Adcock and Collier’s (2001: 539) advice to examine the effects of varying the content 
of indicators, we propose a second, Core, measure that focuses on indications of 
support for a narrower set of core climate policies.
7
  
 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
Convergent/discriminant validation 
We assess the evidence for validity through convergent/discriminant validation in two 
parts. First, we examine the relationship between our measures of parties’ climate 
policy preferences and document attributes that serve as crude indicators of parties’ 
                                                 
7
 The Core measure developed here is unrelated to Jahn’s (2011) Core measure of Left-Right 
preferences. 
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preferences. Second, we examine their relationship with established measures of 
parties’ environmental and climate policy preferences. 
Document attributes 
We examine the following document attributes: whether the document acknowledges 
climate change as a problem; whether it commits the party to climate change targets; 
whether it mentions climate change in its front matter; and the number of mentions of 
‘climate change’ and cognate terms as a proportion of the overall word count. The 
relative frequency of these attributes appears to correspond to their significance as 
indicators of climate policy preferences: of the 64 documents, 40 acknowledge 
climate change as a problem; 31 make commitments to national climate change goals; 
and 19 mention climate change in the document’s front matter.  
We find strong evidence that these attributes are related to the General and 
Core measures of parties’ climate policy preferences. For both measures and all of the 
document attributes the difference in mean values is in the expected direction and, 
with one exception, these differences are statistically significant. The size of the mean 
differences (see Table 2) ranges from 0.7 to 2.3 percentage points, which, given that 
the General and Core content accounts on average for 6% and 5% of manifesto 
content, respectively, seems sizeable. Climate change mentions (mean = 0.03) 
correlate positively and moderately with both measures. The correlation with the Core 
measure (r = 0.45, p = 0.00) is stronger than the correlation with the General measure 
(r = 0.32, p = 0.01). 
 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Established measures 
We also compare our measures to established measures of climate and environmental 
policy preferences for which data are available: the CAP climate policy and 
Environment measures, the CMP Environmental Protection measure and its log-
transformation devised by Lowe et al. (2011), and expert survey environmental 
salience measures. We expect positive correlations with each measure, but we do not 
expect the relationship to be so strong that they might be considered effectively 
identical. We also expect more specific measures of climate policy preferences (e.g., 
the CAP climate policy measure) to correlate more strongly than more general 
measures of environmental policy preferences.  
 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
The results in Table 3 bear out these expectations. The relationship between 
both General and Core measures of ‘pro-climate content’ and four established 
salience-based measures of environment and climate policy is positive in all instances 
and is statistically significant (p < 0.05) in eight of ten instances. The correlations are 
moderate rather than strong and do not approach identity in any instance. They are 
stronger for CAP’s climate-specific measure than for the general environmental 
policy measures, with the exception of Lowe et al.’s (2011) measure. It is notable that 
the Core measure correlates considerably more strongly with CAP705 than the 
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General measure. The wide range of the expert survey correlation coefficients may 
reflect the small number of observations available for these data.  
Positional measures  
To develop a positional measure of climate policy preferences, we counterpose pro- 
and anti-climate content. For content validation, and in contrast to established 
positional measures, this has the merit of pitting two ‘opposites’ against one another, 
rather than two more loosely related concepts (i.e., environment vs economy). 
Overall, 1971 quasi-sentences (2.7% of coded quasi-sentences or 31 per document, on 
average) were coded as ‘anti-climate’ content. Despite our relatively conservative 
approach to coding ‘anti-climate’ content (cf. Compston and Bailey, 2013) a large 
proportion of the substantive content of the anti-climate category consists of general 
economic policies (Table 4). These categories may contribute to a fuller picture of 
parties’ climate policy preferences, but they also risk ‘stretching’ the concept of 
climate policy (Sartori, 1970). At first sight, then, the relationship between this 
content and the concept of ‘climate policy preferences’, seems more tenuous than for 
the ‘pro-climate’ category.  
 
 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
To address this problem, we again identify two groups of quasi-sentences: 
Core content, referring to support for policies that are generally acknowledged as 
20 
 
having a direct impact on greenhouse gas emissions and additional content referring 
to more general economic policies.  
To produce the General ‘positional’ measure of parties’ climate policy 
preferences, we subtract the total anti-climate content from the total pro-climate 
content. This derives a mean climate policy position of 2.7 (sd = 6.2). Likewise, to 
produce a Core positional measure, we subtract parties’ Core anti-climate content 
from their Core pro-climate content. The mean Core position is 4.2 (sd = 3.5). The 
mean (absolute) difference between the General and Core positional scores is 2.1 
points (median = 1.3). 
We again engage in convergent/discriminant validation by comparing these 
measures with document attributes and with established positional measures. The 
former comparison shows substantial and statistically significant mean differences in 
the expected direction (Table 5).  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
General and Core climate policy positions also correlate positively and 
significantly with four existing measures of parties’ environmental policy positions: 
an additive index of two expert-coded positional climate policy items; Weale et al.’s 
(2000) environmental policy index using CMP data; a log-transformed measure 
proposed by Lowe et al. (2011); and positional items in expert surveys (Bakker et al., 
2015; Benoit and Laver, 2006). These correlations are by far the strongest for the 
most climate-specific measure (almost reaching r=0.6); for the general environmental 
policy measures, they range between 0.29 and 0.48.  
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[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Discussion  
Our analysis produces three sets of findings. First, regarding content validation, while 
the content of the ‘pro-climate’ text tends to accord with existing knowledge 
concerning those policy categories most relevant to GHG emissions, the content of 
the anti-climate text as coded initially was less obviously related to the concept of 
climate policy. We responded by creating ‘Core’ measures. Second, regarding 
convergent/discriminant validation, the measures are related to document attributes 
and to established measures of climate and environmental policy preferences. Their 
relationship with climate policy measures is markedly stronger than with 
environmental policy measures, suggesting that they are better measures of climate 
policy preferences than measures of general environmental policy preferences. Yet 
they do not come close to being identical with existing measures, suggesting that they 
constitute a new and distinctive contribution to the measurement of parties’ climate 
policy preferences. Contextual differences between parties (left-right differences, the 
effect of the economic crisis) and accounts of individual cases also converge with 
expectations. Third, we have developed positional measures, which also accord with 
our expectations of convergent/discriminant validation.  
Not only are our measures empirically distinct from extant measures of 
parties’ environmental and climate policy preferences, the approach that produces 
them also has several advantages. It accommodates the cross-sectoral nature of 
climate policy; so, in common with Guinaudeau and Persico’s (2013) approach to EU 
policy, it can provide a model for studies of other cross-sectoral policy areas. The 
coding scheme is relatively simple and, based on existing arguments concerning 
coding scheme design, we assume that this minimises error. The coding process 
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allows for contextual specificity within a systematic framework for scoring cases, 
which enables its application to other contexts, including future party documents, 
whilst being based on a fixed assumption: that reducing GHG emissions will remain 
the central outcome in climate policy. It covers as many aspects of ‘climate policy’ as 
possible, as evidenced by the amount of content coded compared to other projects. In 
the ‘trade-off between parsimony and completeness’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 539), 
we argue that existing measures err on the side of parsimony, not least in the case of 
climate policy. Where there is doubt about the evidence from content validation, our 
coding of subcategories allows researchers to vary the content of the measures 
systematically without having to recode the texts themselves. Finally, in contrast to 
measures of salience, we produce a measure which aims to account for the positional 
aspect of climate politics and which may help to control for contradictions in party 
policy, including ‘greenwashing’.  
These observations require at least two riders. First, our measurements should 
be regarded as ‘falsifiable claims’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 532). Second, we do 
not claim that existing approaches or data are without merit. The moderate-to-strong 
correlations with our measure indicate convergence, even if these measures evidently 
include content that is not relevant to climate policy, or exclude content that is 
relevant to climate policy. Moreover, beyond their measurement of climate policy 
preferences, these approaches have further added value, such as including multiple 
other issues (CAP, CMP) and focusing on interesting theoretical questions (Båtstrand, 
2014, 2015). 
A question that we have not addressed directly is which of our four measures 
is ‘best’. Content validation – a pre-requisite for overall validity – suggests there is 
doubt about our General positional variable, as elements of ‘anti-climate’ policy may 
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stretch the concept of climate policy. More generally, we show that ‘anti-climate 
policy’, while intuitive and useful, can be problematic in its application, even when 
applied conservatively.  
Distinguishing between the merits of the other three measures (General, Core, 
and Core positional measures) is more difficult. We have no ‘true’ measure of parties’ 
climate policy preferences against which they can be evaluated for criterion validity. 
The three measures take into account overlapping but somewhat different content 
(Tables 2 and 4). The relative merit of the positional measure may vary depending on 
how climate policy is conceived as an issue (valence or positional). We have 
highlighted arguments indicating the latter, but we do not regard them as definitive. 
The nature of the issue may vary between context and over time and it may be useful 
to measure both salience and position (Guinaudeau and Persico, 2014). Moreover, 
‘Core’ and ‘Non-core’ content as presented here is an informed approximation rather 
than a definitive distinction.  
Significantly, our analyses show that binary indicators of document attributes 
are valid indicators of parties’ climate policies, as they discriminate between parties 
with stronger and weaker climate policy preferences – a potentially valuable insight 
highlighting measures of party policy preferences that can be collected at low cost. 
We acknowledge that our approach has possible shortcomings. Although our 
positional measure has the merit of pitting two clearly-articulated opposing concepts 
against one another, rather than the traditional ‘economy vs environment’ approach, it 
is not a ‘pure’ positional measure. This problem is difficult to avoid in manifesto-
based approaches focusing on a broad policy dimension. In common with previous 
efforts to derive measures of policy preferences from manifestos, we weight each unit 
of content equally, whereas clearly some policies are more significant for GHG 
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emissions than others. The main alternative is to estimate the ‘weight’ of various 
pieces of content in terms of GHG emissions; outside this approach, a climate policy 
expert survey may implicitly take this into account. Finally, although we explicitly 
focus on minimising error (and maximising validity) through the design of the coding 
scheme and mechanisms of control, standardisation and cross-checking, we also 
acknowledge that using multiple independent coders is desirable and would allow us 
to measure that error.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has presented an innovative approach to measuring parties’ policy 
preferences consisting of a set of salience and positional measures of climate change 
mitigation policy and has applied it to party manifestos in six European countries. It 
has presented evidence for the validity of these measures and has found that they are 
empirically distinct from and more comprehensive than extant measures. It argues 
that these measures represent a significant improvement on existing measures of 
parties’ climate policy preferences. 
When new, cross-sectoral issues come on to the policy agenda and become 
increasingly distinct from established policy dimensions, parties’ preferences 
regarding those issues need to be measured so that questions central to party politics 
can be answered. The approach developed here can be extended to other policy areas 
and may be particularly beneficial for policies that are new, complex or cross-cutting, 
or that include valence and positional elements. One example is immigration policy 
(Castelli Gattinara 2016: 17-20; Kriesi et al., 2008: 66). While immigration is more 
regularly seen as a positional issue than climate change, it could benefit from 
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anchoring its coding in two opposite policy outcomes (more vs less immigration) and 
from the overall simplicity of a one-dimensional coding scheme. Other such issues 
may include European integration and social exclusion. 
Measuring parties’ climate policy preferences is an important step towards 
understanding their development and how they might shape other outcomes, 
especially government policy. We hope that these measures will be taken forward and 
applied to questions that are central to climate politics and to party politics. This may 
lead to further evidence for the validity of these measures, corresponding to 
‘nomological/construct validation’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 543) as hypothesised 
relationships (e.g., between party preferences and government policies or between 
economic conditions and party preferences) are confirmed. This kind of research can 
also contribute to the broader climate change research agenda, and specifically to our 
understanding of the political obstacles to and opportunities for effective policy.
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Figure 1. Pro-climate content 
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Table 1. Pro-climate subcategories 
 
Mean % of pro-
climate content Core subcategories 
Pro-environment 35.1 
Pro-climate policy (other) 14.4 
Pro-lower carbon energy 12.8 
Pro-lower carbon transport 11.4 
Pro-energy efficiency 6.9 
Pro-carbon sinks 3.1 
  
Non-core subcategories  
Planning 7.6 
Agriculture and food 5.6 
Waste 3.1 
Anti-growth 0.03 
See Appendix C for detailed descriptions of these 
subcategories. 
N=62. Two manifestos contained no ‘pro-climate’ 
content. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Document attributes and climate policy preferences 
   
% pro-climate content % Core pro-climate content 
  
N Mean p-value Mean p-value 
Acknowledges 
climate 
change 
No 24 5.1 
0.04 
3.7 
0.00 
Yes 40 6.6 
 
5.8 
   
    
Commits to 
national 
climate goals 
No 33 5.7 
0.16 
4.4  
Yes 31 6.4 
 
5.7 
0.04 
   
    
Climate 
change in 
front matter* 
No 43 5.5 
0.02 
4.3  
Yes 19 7.3 
 
6.6 
0.01 
p-values are for one-tailed t-tests. p-values for tests assuming unequal variance are in italics. 
*Two documents did not include front matter. 
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Table 3. Comparison with existing salience-based measures 
Data source Issue N Measure Pearson’s r p 
CAP Climate* 34 
General 0.42 0.01 
Core 0.54 0.00 
CAP Environment 34 
General 0.29 0.1 
Core 0.39 0.02 
CMP Environmental 
protection 
62** 
General   0.4 0.00 
Core 0.48  0.00 
Lowe et al.  
Environment 
(importance) 
50 
General 
Core 
0.46 
0.54 
0.00 
0.00 
Expert surveys 
(CHES 2010; 
Benoit and 
Laver) 
Environment 24*** 
General 0.42 0.04 
Core 0.32 0.12 
 
* CAP705. The available CAP data does not include Ireland or Germany. 
 
** See Appendix E for details.  
 
*** Benoit and Laver (2006) and Bakker et al. (2015). See Appendix E for details.  
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Table 4. Anti-climate subcategories  
 
Mean % of anti-
climate content Core subcategories 
Pro-roads 8.6 
Pro-aviation and shipping 6.2 
Pro-fossil fuels 3.8 
Anti-environmental taxes 3.4 
Anti-climate (other) 1.8 
Anti-nuclear 1.5 
  
Non-core subcategories  
Pro-growth 32.5 
Anti-taxes 18.6 
Pro-tourism 10.4 
Pro-global free trade 6.5 
Agriculture 2.3 
See Appendix C for detailed descriptions of these 
subcategories. 
N=62. Two manifestos contained no ‘anti-climate’ 
content. 
 
Table 5. Document attributes and climate policy preferences (positional) 
   
General climate 
policy position 
Core climate  
policy position 
  
N Mean p-value Mean p-value 
Acknowledges 
climate 
change 
No 24 0.1 
0.02 
2.6  
Yes 40 4.2 
 
5.2 
0.00 
   
    
Commits to 
national 
climate goals 
No 33 1.2 
0.02 
3.3  
Yes 31 4.2 
 
5.1 
0.02 
   
    
Climate 
change in 
front matter* 
No 43 1.4 
0.00 
3.3  
Yes 19 5.6 
 
6.1 
0.00 
p-values are for one-tailed t-tests. p-values for tests assuming unequal variance are in italics. 
*Two documents did not include front matter. 
 
 34 
 
 
Table 6. Comparison with existing positional measures 
Data Issue N  Pearson’s r p 
EU 
Profiler/EU&I 
Index: Renewables 
and private 
transport taxation* 
21 
General 0.59 0.00 
Core 0.58 0.01 
Environmental 
policy index 
(Weale et al.) 
Environment 62 
General 0.48 0.00 
Core 0.44 0.00 
Lowe et al.  Environment 50 
General 0.34 0.02 
Core 0.29 0.04 
Expert 
surveys**  
Environment 32 
General 0.38 0.03 
Core 0.46 0.01 
 
* See Appendix E for details. 
 
** Benoit and Laver (2006) and CHES 2010 and 2014. See Appendix E for details. 
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Online Appendices 
Online Appendix A. Parties and documents. 
Table A7. Party documents 
Country Election  Centre-left party  Centre-right party  
Denmark 1994 Socialdemokraterne 
 
Det går bedre for 
Danmark. 
Venstre 
 
Det vil Venstre. 
1998 Socialdemokraterne 
 
Det kan gå to veje. 
Vores vei – Deres vej. 
Venstre Det vil Venstre. 
2001 Socialdemokraterne Mennesker Først: Fri 
og fælles i det 21. 
Århundrede. 
Venstre Tid for forandring. 
2005 Socialdemokraterne Mærkesager: Her kan 
du læse om de områder, 
hvor 
Socialdemokraterne vil 
gøre en ekstra indsats. 
Venstre 
 
Valgløfter. 
2007 Socialdemokraterne  Vi vælger velfærd: 
Socialdemokraternes 
grundlag for 
folketingsvalget d. 13. 
November. 
Venstre Valggrundlag, Folketingsvalg 13. 
november 2007: Et endnu bedre 
samfund. 
2011 
 
Socialdemokraterne  
 
Danmark skal videre.** Venstre  
 
Valggrundlag. 
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2015 Socialdemokraterne  Det Danmark du 
kender. 
Venstre  
 
Flere danske job i hele Danmark. 
France 1993 Parti socialiste Le contract pour la 
France. 
Union pour la 
démocratie 
française/ 
Rassemblement pour 
la République*  
Le 40 priorites de l’ UDF pour 
l’alternance /La France en mouvement. 
Rassembler pour changer. 
 
1997 Parti socialiste Changeons d’ Avenir. Union pour la 
démocratie française 
/ Rassemblement 
pour la République*  
Programme du RPR et de l’UDF pour 
les elections legislatives de 1997. 
2002 Parti socialiste Programme pour les 
legislatives 2002. 
Union pour un 
mouvement 
populaire 
25 engagements pour la France, avec 
Jacques Chirac. 
2007 
 
 
Parti socialiste 
 
Réussir ensemble le 
changement.  
 
Union pour un 
mouvement 
populaire  
Contrat de legislature 2007-2012. 
 
2012 Parti socialiste 
 
Le changement c’est 
maintenant. 
Union pour un 
mouvement 
populaire  
Projet 2012: Proteger et preparer 
l’avenir des enfants en France. 
Germany  1994 Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands
  
Reformen fuer 
Deutschland. 
Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union* 
Regierungsprogramm von CDU und 
CSU. 
1998 Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands  
"Arbeit, Innovation und 
Gerechtigkeit" 
SPD-Programm für die 
Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union* 
Wahlplattform von CDU und CSU. 
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Bundestagswahl 1998. 
2002 Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands  
Erneuerung und 
Zusammenhalt - Wir in 
Deutschland 
Regierungsprogramm 
2002 – 2006. 
Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union* 
Leistung und Sicherheit Zeit für Taten 
Regierungsprogramm 2002/2006 von 
CDU und CSU. 
2005 Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
Vertrauen in 
Deutschland. 
Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union* 
Deutschlands: Chancen nutzen. 
2009 Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands  
Sozial und 
Demokratisch. 
Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union* 
Wie haben die Kraft – Gemeinsam für 
unser Land 
2013 Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
Das wir Entscheidet.  Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union* 
Gemeinsam erfolgreich für 
Deutschland. 
Ireland 
*** 
1997 Fianna Fáil  1997 General Election 
Manifesto. 
Fine Gael  Securing and sharing our prosperity. 
2002 Fianna Fáil  Election manifesto 
2002. 
Fine Gael  A Forward looking Ireland. 
2007 Fianna Fáil  Now, the next steps. Fine Gael  General election manifesto 2007. 
2011 Fianna Fáil  Real Plan, Better 
Future. 
Fine Gael  Let’s get Ireland working.  
Italy 1996 L’Ulivo  Tesi per la definizione 
della piattaforma 
Forza Italia  Contratto con gli italiani. 
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programmatica 
dell’Ulivo. 
2001 L’Ulivo* 
 
Rinoviamo l’Italia, 
insieme. Il programma 
dell’Ulivo per il 
governo 2001/2006. 
Casa delle Libertà* Piano di governo per un’intera 
legislature. 
2006 L’Unione* 
 
Per il Bene Dell’Italia. 
Programma di Governo 
2006-2011. 
Casa delle Libertà* 
 
Programma Elettorale. 
2008 Partito Democratico  Un Italia moderna. Si 
puo’ fare. 
Popolo delle Libertà 
 
7missioni per il future dell’Italia.** 
2013 Partito Democratico 
 
L’Italia Giusta. 
Programma. 
Popolo delle Libertà 
 
Noi Ci Impegniamo. Programma. 
Elezioni Politiche 24 25 Febbraio.** 
UK 1997 Labour New Labour because 
Britain deserves better. 
Conservatives  You can only be sure with the 
Conservatives. 
2001 Labour Ambitions for Britain. 
Labour’s manifesto 
2001. 
Conservatives 2001 Conservative Party General 
Election Manifesto. Time for Common 
Sense. 
2005 Labour Britain forward not 
back. The Labour Party 
manifesto 2005. 
Conservatives Are you thinking what we’re thinking? 
It’s time for action. 
2010 Labour The Labour Party 
Manifesto 2010. A 
future fair for all. 
Conservatives Invitation to Join the Government 
Britain. The Conservative Manifesto 
2010. 
2015 Labour 2015. Britain can be Conservatives Strong leadership, a clear economic 
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better. plan and a brighter, more secure future. 
 
* = electoral coalition, ** = programme of a broader electoral coalition, *** = both parties are centre-right 
 
 
 40 
 
Online Appendix B. Coding instructions. 
 
This is an abridged and annotated version of instructions sent to coders in December 
2014. It excludes some variables relating to policy domains that we did not carry 
forward into the coding of all manifestos and which are not relevant to this study. 
These instructions were supplemented by a correctly coded piece of text, by more 
detailed and context-specific discussions with the authors about individual pieces of 
content/policies, and by a guide to identifying quasi-sentences from Froio (2012).  
Existing research indicates that using sentences would have no significant impact on 
our measures’ validity (Däubler et al., 2012), but we follow the CMP and most 
national CAP projects in using quasi-sentences for practical reasons: for four 
countries we had access to the quasi-sentences used by the CAP. 
 
There are four basic coding categories for quasi-sentences: 1. Pro-climate policy; 2. 
Anti-climate policy; 3. Neutral; 4. Not sufficiently relevant. They correspond to codes 
for the ‘ccode’ (climate code) variable.  
 
1. Pro-climate policy quasi-sentences 
These are pieces of text that indicate support for policies that, if implemented, would 
reduce net greenhouse gas emissions or increase carbon sinks.
8
 These quasi-
sentences may be general statements that acknowledge climate change as a policy 
problem (e.g., ‘Climate change is a challenge’), that are in favour of policies that 
would reduce emissions (e.g., ‘We must fight climate change.’), or they may form 
                                                 
8 
Further discussions with coders established that this should be a reduction relative to a 
counterfactual situation in which the policy was not implemented (rather than a reduction per 
se).  
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part of specific proposals for policies that would reduce net
9
 greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Typical examples of climate policy instruments include: emissions trading, 
carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs, low carbon energy quota schemes, bans on fossil fuel 
plants without CCS and emissions or fuel economy standards for cars (Bailey and 
Compston, 2013)
10
. They may also include elements of a domestic framework for 
climate policy (e.g., climate legislation, new or more ambitious emissions targets, 
climate-specific institutions) (EBRD and GRI, 2011). Quasi-sentences that are ‘pro-
climate policy’, may also include proposals to reverse anti-climate policy measures 
(see below). However, they may also include indications of support for a wide range 
of other policies that, if implemented, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
party may or may not explicitly link the policy proposal with emissions reductions. 
Note that climate policies may also include the enhancement of carbon sinks (e.g., 
wetlands). 
 
2. Anti-climate policy quasi-sentences 
These are pieces of text that indicate support for policies that, if implemented, would 
increase net greenhouse gas emissions or reduce carbon sinks.
11
 These quasi-
sentences may be statements that deny that climate change is a problem, general 
statements against policies that would reduce emissions (e.g., ‘We should not give in 
to climate change alarmism’) or (more commonly) they will be policy proposals that 
would increase net GHG emissions (Compston and Bailey, 2013: 147)
12
. These 
                                                 
9
 ‘We specify net emission to exclude policies that simply shift emissions from one location 
[i.e., country] to another’ (Compston and Bailey, 2013: 147). In practice, this proved difficult 
to establish empirically, so we do not refer to net emissions in the main body of the paper. 
10
 Later published as Compston and Bailey (2016). 
11 See fn.8. 
12
 Note that, in contrast to Compston and Bailey, we do not insist that this should be a 
proposal for policy change. An affirmation that a party will stick with a status quo policy that 
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proposals may include the reversal of climate policies (see above). They may also 
include a wide range of policies that have increased emissions as a side-effect. 
Compston and Bailey identify the following as examples of anti-climate policy: 
construction of, or approval/incentives for, new fossil fuel power stations; new or 
increased fossil fuel subsidies; new or increased subsidies for energy-intensive 
industries: iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals and fertilizers, petroleum 
refining, cement and lime, glass and ceramics, pulp and paper, food processing; new 
trade liberalization agreements; new or increased subsidies for the automotive, 
aerospace or shipping industries; construction of, or approval/incentives for, new 
airports; increased support for meat production; and action by state agencies to clear 
forests for farmland, or approval/incentives for this. For a wider range of examples, 
see Table 2 in Compston and Bailey (2013: 148). This table may be a useful (but not 
definitive) guide to identifying anti-climate policies.  
 
Anti-climate policies can be more difficult to identify than pro-climate policies. 
Therefore, in addition to the general guidance provided by Compston and Bailey’s 
(2013) lists, we are developing a list of commonly encountered questions and answers 
so that we can maintain consistency between coders. 
1. Do all policies that would stimulate economic growth count as anti-climate 
policies? Economic growth is linked to emissions (e.g., Stern, 2006: xi, xii). In 
order to maintain consistency across codings, we identify a) positive mentions 
of economic growth and b) proposals for general growth stimulus packages as 
anti-climate policies. However, we do not identify economic activity, job-
                                                                                                                                           
will increase emissions is, for our purposes, just as significant as a policy change that would 
have this effect. 
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creation, house-building, pro-business policies etc. (as such) as anti-climate 
policies. Mentions of “green growth” are pro-climate. 
2. Do low-tax policies count as anti-climate policies? They count only if they are 
statements that could include opposition to a carbon tax. E.g., “We promise no 
new taxes” in a context where there is no carbon tax. However, specific 
promises on income tax or other types of tax do not count as anti-climate 
policies. 
3. Likewise, general statements against regulation might cover regulatory 
climate policies and therefore should be coded as anti-climate policies. 
4. The promotion of international tourism is coded as an anti-climate policy, 
although it is not identified by Compston and Bailey as such. We disregard 
tourism promotion that is explicitly domestic (non-international). 
5. Policies that might encourage population growth (e.g., subsidised childcare) 
are not counted as anti-climate policies (contra. Compston and Bailey). We 
would argue that they are too widely diffused in manifestos and the effects of 
individual policies are too marginal to be coded. 
 
 
Other guidelines: 
 Some pieces of text (pro- and anti-climate policies) will require some further 
research to assess whether they would increase or reduce emissions. One 
example of this has been High Speed Rail in the UK (see Appendix to the 
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coding instructions). You are welcome to submit similar notes with your 
coded data. 
 Context (year and country) is important. Remember that we are examining 
whether text support policies that would increase (reduce) emissions in a 
specific context. For example, in an (hypothetical) energy system powered 
fully by coal, developing new nuclear capacity will clearly be a pro-climate 
policy; in an (hypothetical) energy system powered fully by renewables, 
developing new nuclear capacity would be an anti-climate policy.  
 If in doubt, code the text as you think it should be coded, code it as ‘hcode’ 
(hard to code), enter a comment, and then discuss it with others in the project 
team.  
 
3. Neutral or ambiguous quasi-sentences 
Neutral quasi-sentences are not the same as quasi-sentences that are not sufficiently 
relevant to GHG emissions. A neutral (or ambiguous) quasi-sentence should be 
relevant to net GHG emissions, but its content should imply that net emissions would 
be maintained at current levels (e.g., by clearly displacing emissions nationally or 
internationally [see footnote on net emissions, above] or by including policies that 
both increase and reduce emissions).  
 
4. Quasi-sentences that are not sufficiently relevant  
These are quasi-sentences that are not sufficiently relevant to net greenhouse gas 
emissions to be coded as 1, 2 or 3 (e.g., ‘We are committed to improving language 
education in schools’). We identify these quasi-sentences (so that we can count them) 
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but we do not need to enter ‘4’ in each instance (we can simply leave the cells blank 
for now).  
 
Summary of variables 
The key variables are as follows: 
 Year 
 Party.  
 Qsno: Sequential numbers assigned to quasi-sentences.  
 Qstext: “text” of the QS 
 Hsplit: ‘hard split’ (0/1) – if you are unsure about whether the sentence should 
be split into quasi-sentences or not (see Froio 2012: 5). 
 Junk (0/1) (see Froio 2012: 5) 
 Head (0/1) (see Froio 2012: 5) 
 Ccode: 1, 2, 3 or 4 (see above) 
 Hcode (0/1): ‘hard code’ – if you have remaining doubts about some aspect of 
the coding that you have done (see also Froio 2012: 7). 
 Comment: to help anyone who uses the data with resolving outstanding 
problems or understanding the coding. 
 
Appendix to Coding Instructions: High speed rail in the UK 2010 manifestos 
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How should high speed rail content be coded for UK manifestos in 2001, 2005 and 
2010?  
1. The Government's March 2010 plan entitled High Speed Rail cited HS2’s estimate 
that the emissions impact would be between -25 and +26.6 million tonnes 
(Department for Transport, 2010: 53).  
2. In 2010, the Climate Change Committee also suggested that it would be carbon 
neutral (Climate Change Committee, 2010: 185).  
3. An NGO report in 2012 suggested that there would be savings in the 60 year 
timeframe (Greengauge, 2012) and in November 2013 the Department of Transport 
believed that it would produce carbon savings (Department of Transport, 2013). 
4. A HS2 briefing (‘CS034’) published in November 2013 suggested that in the first 
sixty years of the project, savings would be less than emissions. 
 
For the purposes of coding the manifestos, #1 and #2 are most important, as they 
reflected the available analysis at the time of the 2010 manifestos and they are the 
most authoritative sources. Note also that Greengauge is a pro-HS2 NGO. Therefore, 
I suggest coding high speed rail in the UK as ambiguous/neutral. 
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Online Appendix C. Coding subcategories. 
 
These are the categories that we use in the coding scheme to describe individual 
pieces of text. They were developed inductively. Initially, coders gave the text a 
primary label and a secondary label if appropriate. Where more than one label 
applied, final decisions on the primary label were based on which category was 
primary in a quasi-sentence or (if that did not differentiate between the elements) 
which was mentioned first. The categories listed below were constructed by merging 
multiple logically coherent subcategories (i.e., labels). Coding is context-specific (i.e., 
the same policy proposal may have a different effect on GHG emissions in different 
countries or at different times). The descriptions below indicate content that is 
typically included (and not included) in the subcategories and, thus in the overall pro-
climate and anti-climate categories. 
 
An asterisk* indicates a subcategory that is excluded for the calculation of Core 
measures. 
 
Pro-climate categories 
Pro-environment. Pro-environment text that potentially includes climate policy. 
Includes general statements in favour of environmental protection that may include 
the climate, pro-environmentalism, pro-sustainable development, pro-green growth, 
general criticisms of the government’s environment policy that potentially include but 
are not specific to climate policy, pro-general environmental EU action that 
potentially includes climate change, pro-use of environmental indicators, pro-foreign 
environmental aid, pro-environmental taxation, sustainable tourism. 
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Pro-lower carbon energy. Pro-renewables and cleaner energy. Includes nuclear and 
includes gas distribution where this would be an improvement on the status quo in 
terms of GHG emissions. The coding scheme is typically indifferent on privatization 
of the energy sector unless there is evidence that it would contribute to reduced GHG 
emissions. Inclusion of content in favour of international interconnections depends on 
context. It includes proposals on clean coal in the few instances where they occur, 
giving parties the benefit of the doubt regarding its feasibility and impact. 
 
Pro-energy efficiency. Energy efficiency measures. Includes buildings’ energy 
efficiency. Includes smart grids and efficiency in transmission and generation. 
Includes measures to prevent water wastage during distribution or consumption. 
 
Pro-lower carbon transport. Pro-public transport, cycling and pedestrians, cleaner 
vehicles, road-pricing. Includes general mentions of ‘sustainable transport’, pro-road 
pricing. Includes high-speed rail where there is evidence that it would reduce 
emissions. Safety (eg., rail safety) is not included. Establishment of transport 
regulators or chiefs not generally included unless specifically aimed at improved 
lower carbon transport. Anti-road congestion measures are not included. Rural 
transport schemes are included if they mainly imply public transport supports. 
Includes bus links to airports. Includes teleworking. 
 
Pro-carbon sinks. Pro-forestry, wetlands, protection of green areas. Includes 
promotion of brownfield development instead of greenfield development.  
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Pro-climate policy (other). Content that has not been included in named categories 
in this table. Includes acknowledgement of climate change as a problem; 
acknowledgement of climate change impacts; general statements in favour of 
emissions reductions and climate action; specific climate policy proposals (e.g., 
climate legislation, carbon tax, GHG emissions limits).  
 
Waste.* All pro-climate content at all stages of the waste cycle. Includes all related 
content that indicates support for waste policies that would reduce GHG emissions or 
increase sinks.  
 
Planning.* Spatial planning, pro-urban living measures. 
 
Agriculture and food.* Environmental protection measures in agriculture, 
aquaculture and forestry that include (or that may include) emissions-relevant 
measures. Opposition to subsidies for GHG-intensive agriculture (including pro-CAP 
reform statements). Pro-domestic consumption of local and national food. Includes 
policies for better provenance labelling but do not include international trade 
promotion of local produce. Does not  include organic farming. 
 
Anti-growth.* Explicit anti-economic growth statements.  
 
Anti-climate categories 
Anti-environmental taxes. Includes text that is anti-environmental taxes, anti-carbon 
tax, anti-fuel tax, pro-lower carbon tax, opposition to increased environmental 
taxation or pro-additional exemptions to an environmental tax.  
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Pro-aviation and shipping. Includes support for the aerospace industry. Pro-shipping 
content is included where this does not clearly displace higher-carbon transport.  
 
Pro-roads. Support for road-building. Support for buying cars and for the car 
industry. Road safety is not included.  
 
Anti-nuclear. Does not include opposition to specific waste storage facilities or to 
specific facilities abroad (e.g., Sellafield in the Irish case).  
 
Pro-fossil fuels. Pro-fossil fuel extraction and in favour of consumption where these 
are not ‘cleaner’ (i.e., less GHG-intensive) sources.  
 
Other anti-climate. Content that has not been included in named categories above.  
 
Agriculture.* Text explicitly in favour of GHG-intensive agriculture. Includes 
content in favour of the CAP and other subsidies for GHG-intensive farming.  We 
code this conservatively; only explicit supports for GHG-intensive farming are coded. 
 
Pro-growth.* Explicit positive mentions of economic growth. Only explicit positive 
mentions of ‘economic growth’. Also includes general growth-stimulus measures 
(e.g., general stimulus packages) and explicit pro-consumption mentions. Does not 
include economic growth in the context of least-developed countries. 
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Anti-taxes.* Fewer or lower taxes. General: must not be specific to one type of (non-
climate relevant) taxation.  
Anti-regulation.* Less regulation. General: must not be specific to one type of (non-
climate relevant) regulation. And can be specific to environmental or climate 
regulation. Does not include general statements concerning national competitiveness.  
 
Pro-tourism.* Does not include measures directed explicitly at domestic tourism. 
Does not include ‘sustainable tourism’, which is coded as pro-climate.  
 
Pro-global free trade.* Support for global free trade regimes. Does not include 
specific pro-export or pro-trade content. International regime level: content that is 
simply in favour of national exports is not included. Global scope: EU single-market 
not included.  
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Online Appendix D. Questionnaire. 
 
Coding document 3: Document description questionnaire  
Which party, year and document are you answering for? 
 
Problem acknowledgement 
1. Does the document reject, ignore or acknowledge the problem of climate 
change? If it rejects or acknowledges climate change, then provide a typical 
example from the text in native language with an English translation. 
 
2. Does the document acknowledge present or future impacts of climate change 
(e.g., on health, immigration, biodiversity, flooding etc.)? Which impacts does 
it acknowledge? This can include local, national and international impacts. 
 
Climate goals 
3. Does the document commit the party to general national climate goals (e.g., 
specific emissions levels at specific dates, carbon neutrality). Describe these 
goals. You can disregard specific goals on renewable energies or on sectoral 
emissions. 
 
Prominence/attention 
4. What was the title of the section that dealt (more than any other section) with 
climate change issues? Where was the section that dealt with climate change 
placed in the manifesto? Answer: section X of Y. And: begins on page X of Y 
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(for this, use the overall number of pages in the pdf/paper document rather 
than the assigned page numbering). 
 
5. Is climate change mentioned in the ‘front matter’ of the document? Which 
parts (cover, table of contents, foreword, introduction, leader’s introduction, 
other [describe]). 
 
6. How often is “climate” (in a climate change-relevant context, excluding uses 
such as ‘political climate’ or ‘business climate’) or “global warming” 
mentioned in the document? What is the overall word count? Use the text file 
from polidoc.net to get an overall word count.  
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Online Appendix E. Notes on data used for Tables 3 and 6. 
 
Note on CMP data used in analyses described by Table 3. Forza Italia’s values in 
the CMP for 2006 were compared with the Casa delle Libertà document in our data. 
For France in 1993, we used the mean value of the UDF and RPR in the CMP data. 
We compared the Italian Ulivo’s value in 1996 to the Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra in the CMP data. 
 
Note on expert survey data used in analyses described by Table 3. Benoit and 
Laver’s (2006) measure refers to the importance of the issue for the party; CHES data 
refers to the ‘importance/salience’ of the issue for the party. Expert survey (and EU 
Profiler/EU&I data in the analyses that follow in Table 6 were paired with the closest 
election within 2.5 years either side of the time point. The time point for Benoit and 
Laver’s data is assumed to be mid-2003; CHES is assumed to be mid-2010 (and mid-
2014 for the analyses in Table 6. For the Ulivo in 2001, we use the mean of DS and 
the Margherita in the Benoit and Laver survey; likewise, we use the mean of UDF 
and RPR for the French centre-right. 
 
Note on EU Profiler/EU&I data used in analyses described by Table 6. The items 
used for the index are as follows: ‘The promotion of public transport should be 
fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)’ and ‘Renewable sources of energy 
(e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy 
costs’. The responses range from ‘Strongly agree’ to ‘Strongly disagree’ on a five-
point Likert scale. 
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Note on expert survey data used in analyses described by Table 6. The CHES 
item is as follows:  ‘0 = Strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost 
of economic growth; 10 = Strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of 
environmental protection’. The Benoit/Laver item is identical, with the exception of 
the word ‘strongly’, which it excludes. The correlations with the CHES data only 
(n=20) are very similar to the results in Table 6, albeit with higher p values. 
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Online Appendix F. Report on results excluding Denmark. 
Document characteristics (cf. Tables 2 and 5): across the four sets of tests that we did 
(one for each measure), the mean differences between groups decline. They lose their 
significance only for one of our four measures (the General measure). In all instances, 
the differences continue to be in the expected direction. 
 
Comparisons with existing measures of environment and climate policy preferences 
(cf. Tables 3 and 6): the results range from very similar results to those with the full 
data set (for the CMP, n=50); to higher correlation coefficients that lead to 
substantively similar conclusions (for the expert survey data, n=26); to similar 
correlation coefficients that lose significance (CAP Environment category [n=24], 
expert survey salience measures [n=24]; EU Profiler/EU&I positional measures 
[n=17]). The correlation coefficients between our positional measures and Lowe et 
al’s positional measure becomes considerably weaker (r = 0.2; n=40) and clearly non-
significant. One set of results is substantively different: correlations with the CAP 
climate measure (n=24) loses significance and becomes negative (albeit weakly so). 
Both this and increased p-values associated with other variables may be accounted for 
by the low number of observations for which data is available in both the CAP and 
our data set.  
 
In addition, the comparison of parties of the centre-left and centre right produces 
almost identical results and the mean difference between pre- and post-economic 
crisis documents remains similar, albeit losing its statistical significance. 
 
